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The First Rape Conviction at the ICC 
 
An Analysis of the Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo Judgement 





On 21 March 2016, the International Criminal Court convicted Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 
a Congolese politician, of crimes against humanity (rape and murder) and war crimes (rape, 
murder and pillage). Specifically, the Trial Chamber found Bemba, the leader of the 
Mouvement de libération du Congo (MLC), to be responsible under Article 28 of the Rome 
Statute for crimes committed by MLC soldiers in the Central African Republic. Bemba was 
the first defendant to be convicted of rape at the ICC, and the aim of this article is to explore 
how the judgement contributes to existing international jurisprudence on this crime. It 
focuses on the Trial Chamber’s definition of rape, its discussion of the effects of rape and its 




To this day, men, women and children who survived 
are still haunted by the horror of what happened to 
them, and what they saw happen to other victims.  
Lives have been destroyed for years and it will take 





On 21 March 2016, Trial Chamber III of the International Criminal Court (ICC) found the 
former vice-president of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, guilty of crimes against humanity and war crimes, including rape. This is a highly 
significant judgement on two key levels. Firstly, Bemba, the former leader of the Mouvement 
de libération du Congo (MLC), is the first ICC defendant to be convicted on the basis of 
command responsibility.2 To cite the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, the verdict thus 
1 F. Bensouda, ‘Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, Regarding the 
Conviction of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba: “This Case has Highlighted the Critical Need to Eradicate Sexual and 
Gender-Based Crimes as Weapons in Conflict”’, 21 March 2016, available online at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/otp-stat-bemba-21-03-2016.aspx (visited 
25 March 2016). 
2 Bemba is not, however, the first leader to be held responsible for crimes involving sexual violence. In 2014, 
for example, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
held that by virtue of their participation in a Joint Criminal Enterprise, Nikola Šainović (the Deputy Prime 
Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), Sreten Lukić (the head of the Serbian Ministry of Interior 
                                                          
‘…sends a strong signal that commanders will be held responsible for international crimes 
committed by those under their authority’.3 Secondly, this is the first ICC case to end in a 
conviction for rape.4 Samira Daoud, from Amnesty International, has therefore described the 
verdict as ‘an historic moment in the battle for justice and accountability for victims of sexual 
violence in the Central African Republic and around the world’.5 At the very least, the Bemba 
judgement can give hope to thousands of men and women across the globe that some 
measure of justice, however slow it is in coming, is possible. The fight against impunity for 
rape and sexual violence in conflict is necessarily a long and difficult one, and every ‘victory’ 
in the process is a step forward. 
 
This article focuses specifically on Bemba’s convictions for rape, and more precisely on the 
way in which the Court approached and discussed these crimes. A rich body of international 
jurisprudence on rape already exists, and the article’s core purpose is to explore how the 
Bemba judgement adds to this case law. It seeks to demonstrate that while the judgement 
builds on the work of other tribunals, in particular the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 
certain aspects of it are nevertheless distinctive. Divided into four sections, the article’s first 
section provides background information about the Bemba trial and the MLC’s crimes. The 
remaining sections analyze and disaggregate the significance of the judgement by exploring 
three particular components of it, namely its definition of rape, its explicit references to the 
consequences of rape and its discussion of the perpetrators’ motives. 
 
Affairs) and Nebojša Pavković (the commander of the Third Army of the Yugoslav Army or VJ) were 
responsible for sexual assaults committed by VJ soldiers in Kosovo. Judgement, Šainović, Pavković, Lazarević 
and Lukić (IT-05-87-A), Appeal Judgement, 23 January 2014, § 1582, 1592, 1603. See also Judgement, 
Đorđević (IT-05-87/1-A), Appeal Judgement, 27 January 2014, § 929. 
 
3 UN, ‘Statement Attributable to the Spokesperson of the Secretary-General on Judgement of the International 
Criminal Court regarding Jean-Pierre Bemba’, 22 March 2016, available online at 
http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=9554 (visited 25 March 2016). 
4 The trial of Germain Katanga, a former leader of the Force de Résistance Patriotique en Ituri in the DRC, was 
the first ICC case to include charges of rape (and sexual slavery). On 7 March 2014, however, the Trial 
Chamber acquitted Katanga of being an accessory to these crimes, which were committed during an attack on 
the Ituri village of Bogoro in February 2003. It adjudged that rape and sexual slavery did not fall within the 
‘common purpose’ that underpinned the Bogoro attack. Judgement, Katanga (ICC-01/04-01/07), Trial 
Judgement, 7 March 2014, § 1664, 1693. 
 
5 Cited in Amnesty International, ‘ICC Conviction of Former Congolese Vice-President of Rape as War Crime – 
“Historic Moment”’, 21 March 2016, available online at https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/icc-
conviction-former-congolese-vice-president-rape-war-crime-historic-moment (visited 2 April 2016). 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
2. Bemba’s Criminal Responsibility 
 
 
Bemba was the leader of the MLC, which he founded in November 1998. Now a political 
party, the MLC was one of the rebel movements that fought against the Congolese 
government during the Second Congo War (1998-2003).6 In October 2002, however, the 
MLC was needed in the CAR. President Ange-Félix Patassé was dealing with an insurgency 
launched by his former Chief of Staff, François Bozizé; and on 25 October 2002, Patassé 
requested from Bemba the assistance of the MLC – and in particular its military wing, the 
Armée de libération du Congo (ALC). Bozizé had been dismissed from military service in 
October 2001, and this led to desertions within the Forces armées centrafricaines (FACA). 
Former members of the army subsequently regrouped in Chad, and in October 2002 they re-
entered the CAR and began fighting against the FACA.  
 
Bemba, responding immediately to the call for assistance, ‘deployed ALC troops from the 
DRC to the CAR to intervene in support of President Patassé’.7 His troops arrived in the 
CAR on 26 October 2002 and remained in the country until 15 March 2003, when they 
returned to the DRC. During the ‘2002-2003 CAR Operation’, Bemba’s troops committed 
numerous crimes, including rape. The Trial Chamber established, for example, that ‘…at the 
end of October 2002, in a compound in the Bondoro neighbourhood of Bangui [the CAR 
capital], two soldiers,8 by force, invaded P68’s body by penetrating her vagina with their 
penises’;9 and ‘…at the end of October or beginning of November 2002, on a ferry docked at 
the Port Beach naval base in Bangui, perpetrators, by force, invaded the bodies of eight 
women from Boy-Rabé and PK12 by penetrating their vaginas with their penises’.10 Girls as 
6 According to Deibert, ‘The movement was largely sponsored by Uganda, and, unlike the ever shifting web of 
alliances of other Congolese rebel groups, the MLC had a top-down management style with Bemba at its head 
that would remain largely intact for the duration of the war’. M. Deibert, The Democratic Republic of Congo: 
Between Hope and Despair (London: Zed Books, 2013), 70. 
7 Judgement, Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08), Trial Judgement, 21 March 2016, § 380. 
8 The Trial Chamber found beyond reasonable doubt that, in light of, inter alia, their uniforms, language 
(Lingala), troop movements and the fact that some victims and witnesses had identified them as 
‘Banyamulengués’ (ethnic Tutsis in the DRC), the perpetrators of these crimes were MLC soldiers. Ibid., at § 
634, 636.  
 
9 Ibid., at § 464. 
10 Ibid., at § 483. 
                                                          
young as 12 and 13 were also violated.11 In addition, widespread pillaging occurred12 and 
frequently accompanied acts of rape and murder.13 The Trial Chamber found that 28 men and 
women were raped14 – often by several perpetrators and sometimes in public or in front of 
family members.15 It also emphasized, however, that the specific acts covered in the 
judgement ‘constitute only a portion of the total number of acts of murder and rape MLC 
soldiers committed’16.  
 
Notwithstanding these crimes committed by his subordinates, Bemba initially carried on with 
his life as normal. Between 2003 and 2006, he was one of the DRC’s vice-presidents; and in 
2006, he stood as a candidate in the country’s presidential elections. He lost to Joseph 
Kabila,17 but was subsequently elected to the Congolese Senate. However, just two years 
later, on 24 October 2008, he was arrested in Belgium, on an arrest warrant issued by the ICC 
Pre-Trial Chamber the previous day. He was charged, on the basis of command 
responsibility, with the crimes against humanity of murder and rape, and with the war crimes 
of murder, rape and pillaging. The trial commenced on 22 November 2010.  
 
Article 28 of the Rome Statute states, in relevant part, that: 
 
In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under this Statute for crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court: 
 
11 Ibid., at § 469. 
12 Ibid., at § 643-648. 
13 Ibid., at § 643. 
14 Ibid., at § 633. It is interesting to note that when describing the crimes committed, the Chamber 
overwhelmingly used the words ‘penetrated’ and ‘invaded’, rather than ‘raped’. Usage of the term ‘invaded’ is 
consistent with the terminology employed in the Elements of Crimes under the Rome Statute – and specifically 
in Articles 7 (1) (g)-1 and 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-1, § 1-2. See Elements of Crimes, available online at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/336923D8-A6AD-40EC-AD7B-45BF9DE73D56/0/ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf (visited 28 
March 2016). In the trial of Jean-Paul Akayesu at the ICTR, the Trial Chamber similarly defined rape as, inter 
alia, ‘a physical invasion of a sexual nature…’. Judgement, Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-T), Trial Judgement, 2 
September 1998, § 598. According to Obote-Odora, the terminology of invasion ‘shifts the focus to the harm 
that the assailant causes the victim’. A. Obote-Odora, ‘Rape and Sexual Violence in International Law: ICTR 
Contribution’, 21 New England Journal of International and Comparative Law (2005) 135-159, at 151. 
15 See, for example, ibid., at § 488. 
16 Ibid., at § 671. 
17 According to Prunier, ‘The cannibalism practiced by Bemba’s troops in Ituri during the war resurfaced as an 
election issue’. G. Prunier, From Genocide to Continental War: The “Congolese” Conflict and the Crisis of 
Contemporary Africa (London: Hurst & Company, 2009), 310. 
                                                          
(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander shall be 
criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by 
forces under his or her effective command and control, or effective authority and 
control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly 
over such forces, where: 
 
(i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at 
the time, should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such 
crimes; and 
 
(ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and reasonable 
measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit 
the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.18 
 
 
During the 2002-2003 CAR Operation, Bemba was largely based in Gbadolite, in Equateur 
Province in the DRC. However, the Trial Chamber found that as the president of the MLC 
and the commander-in-chief of the ALC, he was very much aware of everything that his 
troops were doing in the CAR.19 For example, Bemba communicated directly with 
commanders in the field,20 including with Colonel Moustapha who led the CAR Operation;21 
he made several visits to the CAR;22 he had disciplinary power over the MLC;23 and it was 
Bemba who ultimately ordered his troops to withdraw from the CAR.24 The Trial Chamber 
thus concluded that Bemba had operational control over MLC forces in the CAR throughout 
the duration of the 2002-2003 CAR Operation;25 and that he ‘knew that the MLC forces 
18 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, available online at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf (visited 22 March 
2016). 
19 Judgement, Bemba, supra note 7, at §423-425. According to Stearns, ‘…Bemba was the unquestioned leader 
of the MLC, politically as well as militarily. From command central on his couch, he micromanaged the 
organization, one hand on the remote control of his television, another on his satellite phone or ham radio’. J.K. 
Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa (New York: 
Public Affairs, 2011), 227. 
 
20 The Trial Chamber found that ‘Generally, however, Mr Bemba did not direct operations at the tactical level or 
issue orders regarding the specific manoeuvres of the various units in the field’. Ibid., at § 399.  
 
21 On the basis of ‘corroborated and reliable evidence’ the Trial Chamber found that ‘…Colonel Moustapha and 
Mr Bemba regularly communicated by Thuraya [satellite phones] and phonie, with Colonel Moustapha 
reporting the status of operations and the situation at the front’. Ibid., at § 423. 
22 Ibid., at § 426. 
23 Ibid., at § 449. 
24 Ibid., at § 559. 
25 Ibid., at § 446. 
                                                          
under his effective authority and control were committing or about to commit the crimes 
against humanity of murder and rape, and the war crimes of murder, rape, and pillaging’.26 
 
As to whether or not Bemba had also failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures to 
prevent or repress the crimes committed by his troops, the Trial Chamber acknowledged that 
he had taken some steps in response to what was happening on the ground. He established, 
for example, the Mondonga Inquiry to investigate allegations of MLC crimes in the CAR,27 
as a result of which a court-martial was held in Gbadolite, in December 2002, for seven MLC 
soldiers accused of pillaging.28 He also set up the Zongo Commission to look into claims that 
goods pillaged by the MLC were entering the DRC.29 The Mondonga Inquiry, however, did 
not address reports of rape;30 the seven soldiers who faced court-martial were only tried for 
pillaging minor goods and small amounts of money;31 and both the remit and the composition 
of the Zongo Commission were highly circumscribed.32 The Trial Chamber thus adjudged 
that the measures which Bemba took were ‘a grossly inadequate response’ to the crimes 
being committed by his soldiers.33 It further found that these measures did not reflect any 
genuine desire on the part of Bemba to deal with the situation. Rather, his primary concern 
was simply to repair the MLC’s public image.34 
 
Having established that Bemba was criminally responsible under Article 28(a) for the crimes 
committed by the MLC during the 2002-2003 CAR Operation, the Trial Chamber convicted 
him of crimes against humanity (murder and rape) and war crimes (murder, rape and 
pillaging).35 While command responsibility is a well-established doctrine in international 
26 Ibid., at § 717. 
27 Ibid., at § 582. 
28 Ibid., at § 597. The Trial Chamber noted that ‘All seven accused were convicted and sentenced to between 
three and 24 months of detention exclusively on the basis of their own statements; no other witnesses or victims 
were interviewed and no physical evidence was collected’. Ibid., at § 599. 
 
29 Ibid., at § 601. 
 
30 Ibid., at § 589. 
31 Ibid., at § 720. 
32 Ibid., at § 722. 
33 Ibid., at § 727. 
34 Ibid., at § 728. 
35 Ibid., at § 752. 
                                                          
criminal law,36 the fact that Bemba is the first ICC defendant to be convicted on this basis 
means that the case relays a particularly powerful message about leadership and its 
concomitant responsibilities. Fundamentally, it sends an unambiguous warning to 
commanders that they ‘cannot take advantage of their power and status to grant to 
themselves, or their troops, unchecked powers over the life and fate of civilians’.37 The Trial 
Chamber also made it clear that it was treating command responsibility as a mode of 
liability,38 not as a separate offence of omission.39 According to Article 28(a) of the Rome 
Statute, commanders are criminally responsible for the crimes committed by their forces.40 
 
In her research on variations in war rape, Wood highlights the importance of commanders. 
The crux of her thesis is that ‘If commanders prohibit sexual violence (or if they promote 
sexual violence but the hierarchy is too weak to enforce that policy), and if individual 
combatants and their units endorse norms against sexual violence, little sexual violence by 
those combatants will occur’.41 It follows, thus, that holding commanders responsible for acts 
of rape and sexual violence committed by their troops is an important part of any multi-
dimensional approach to tackling and curbing these crimes. The possible deterrent functions 
36 In the Čelebići case, the ICTY Trial Chamber noted: ‘That military commanders and other persons occupying 
positions of superior authority may be held criminally responsible for the unlawful conduct of their subordinates 
is a well-established norm of customary and conventional international law’. Judgement, Mucić et al. (IT-96-21-
T), Trial Judgement, 16 November 1998, § 332. 
 
37 Bensouda, supra note 1. 
38 Judgement, Bemba, supra note 7, at § 171. Van Sliedregt notes that ‘command responsibility is a multi-
layered concept that has traits of a separate offence – a failure to act – and of a mode of liability, a form of 
participation’. E. van Sliedregt, ‘Command Responsibility at the ICTY – Three Generations of Case-Law and 
Still Ambiguity’, in B. Swart, A. Zahar and G. Sluiter (eds), The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 377-500, at 379. The correct 
conceptualization of command responsibility remains a much-debated issue within existing international 
jurisprudence. In the Čelebići case at the ICTY, for example, the Appeals Chamber underlined that ‘As long as a 
superior has effective control over subordinates, to the extent that he can prevent them from committing crimes 
or punish them after they committed the crimes, he would be held responsible for the commission of the crimes 
if he failed to exercise such abilities of control’. Judgement, Mucić et al. (IT-96-21-A), Appeal Judgement, 20 
February 2001, § 198. In the Krnojelac case, however, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that ‘It cannot be 
overemphasized that, where responsibility is concerned, an accused is not charged with the crimes of his 
subordinates but with his failure to carry out his duty as a superior to exercise control’. Judgement, Krnojelac 
(IT-97-25-A), Appeal Judgement, 17 September 2003, § 171. 
 
39 In her Separate Opinion, Judge Ozaki underlined that ‘…the jurisdiction of the Court is complementary to 
national jurisdictions, and should focus on addressing the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community and those persons most responsible for them, rather than addressing a dereliction of duty as such’. 
Judgement, Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08), Separate Opinion of Judge Kuniko Ozaki, 21 March 2016, §5.  
 
40 Author’s emphasis. 
41 E.J. Wood, ‘Armed Groups and Sexual Violence: When is Wartime Rape Rare?’ 36 Politics and Society 
(2009) 131-162, at 141. 
                                                          
of command responsibility, however, lie beyond the scope of this paper. The focus of this 
research is specifically on the contribution that the Bemba judgement makes to existing 
international jurisprudence on rape, starting with how the judgement defines rape. 
 
 
3. Defining Rape, De-Centring Consent 
 
 
Until the late 1990s, there was no definition of rape in international law.42 Today, a 
substantial body of international jurisprudence exists, but, as Weiner has emphasized, 
‘International criminal tribunals prosecuting crimes of sexual violence in prior conflict zones 
such as Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and the former Yugoslavia have struggled to develop a 
coherent definition of the elements of rape’.43 At the heart of this issue is the relationship 
between rape, force/coercion and consent.  
 
The Kunarac approach 
In the ICTY’s recent first instance judgement against Radovan Karadžić, the former Bosnian 
Serb leader, the Trial Chamber noted that ‘Rape involves sexual penetration, however slight: 
(a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used 
by the perpetrator or (b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator, where 
such sexual penetration occurs without the consent of the victim’.44 This was the definition 
that was adopted in the trial of Kunarac, Kovač and Vuković, the ICTY’s leading case on 
rape. The defendants were Bosnian Serb soldiers who stood accused of the mass rape of 
Bosnian Muslim (Bosniak) women in the town of Foča, in eastern BiH. The fact that these 
42 In the Furundžija trial at the ICTY, the Trial Chamber stressed that ‘No definition of rape can be found in 
international law’. Judgement, Furundžija (IT-95-17/1-T), Trial Judgement, 10 December 1998, § 175. The 
significance of this clearly emerged in the Kaing Guek Eav (‘Duch’) case at the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). The Trial Chamber in that case treated rape as part of the crime against humanity 
of torture, but not as a crime against humanity in its own right. Judgement, Kaing (001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC), 
Trial Judgement, 26 July 2010, §567. The Co-Prosecutors appealed against this. The Supreme Court Chamber, 
however, noting that the Court’s jurisdiction extends from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979, emphasized that 
during these four years, there was no international treaty or convention that prohibited rape as a crime against 
humanity. Judgement, Kaing (001/18-07-2007-ECCC/S), Appeal Judgement, 3 February 2012, § 176. Further 
underlining that it was not until the 1990s that rape began to take shape as a crime against humanity (§ 179), the 
Supreme Court Chamber concluded that ‘…a survey of custom and treaties before and during the ECCC’s 
temporal jurisdiction indicates that rape was not a distinct crime against humanity under those sources of 
international law at the relevant time’ (§ 180). This ground of the Co-Prosecutors’ appeal accordingly failed. 
 
43 P. Weiner, ‘The Evolving Jurisprudence of the Crime of Rape in International Criminal Law’, 54 Boston 
College Law Review (2013) 1207-1237, at 1207. 
 
44 Judgement, Karadžić (IT-95-5/18-T), Trial Judgement, 24 March 2016, § 511. 
                                                          
abuses occurred in camps and other places of detention led the Trial Chamber to revisit the 
definition of rape adopted three years earlier in the Furundžija case. It opined that the 
Furundžija definition, which requires sexual penetration accompanied by coercion, force or 
threat of force against the victim or a third person,45 is essentially too narrow because it does 
‘not refer to other factors which would render an act of sexual penetration non-consensual or 
non-voluntary on the part of the victim…’.46 
 
Emphasizing that rape is quintessentially a violation of sexual autonomy,47 the key issue for 
the Kunarac Trial Chamber was not whether force or coercion had been used, but rather 
whether the victims had been in a position to give consent. The Trial Chamber thus defined 
rape as entailing more than simply an absence of consent. What it also required is that 
consent, when given, must be ‘given voluntarily, as a result of the victim’s free will, assessed 
in the context of the surrounding circumstances’.48 What Kunarac tells us, therefore, is that 
rape is fundamentally about consent, but that consent becomes redundant if circumstances 
(beyond coercion, force or threat of force) are such that it cannot be freely given.49 The 
Appeals Chamber agreed with this.50  
45 The Trial Chamber in Furundžija defined rape as: ‘(i) the sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina 
or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or (b) of the 
mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; (ii) by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim 
or a third person’. Judgement, Furundžija, supra note 42, at § 185. 
46 Judgement, Kunarac, Kovač and Vuković (IT-96-23-T& IT-96-23/1-T), Trial Judgement, 22 February 2001, § 
438. 
 
47 Ibid., at § 440. 
 
48 ‘[T[he actus reus of the crime of rape in international law is constituted by: the sexual penetration, however 
slight: (a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the 
perpetrator; or (b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; where such sexual penetration 
occurs without the consent of the victim. Consent for this purpose must be consent given voluntarily, as a result 
of the victim’s free will, assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances. The mens rea is the intention 
to effect this sexual penetration, and the knowledge that it occurs without the consent of the victim’. Ibid., at § 
460. 
 
49 Ibid., at § 460. This is consistent with Article 96 (ii) of the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence which 
states that ‘consent shall not be allowed as a defence if the victim (a) has been subjected to or threatened with or 
has had reason to fear violence, duress, detention or psychological oppression, Or (b) reasonably believed that if 
the victim did not submit, another might be so subjected, threatened or put in fear’. ICTY Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence, available online at 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure_evidence/IT032Rev50_en.pdf (visited 26 March 
2016). Although consent was not discussed in the Furundžija case, the Trial Chamber essentially reached the 
same conclusion and underlined its position that ‘any form of captivity vitiates consent’. Furundžija, 
Judgement, supra note 42, at § 271.  
 
                                                          
Other courts have largely followed the Kunarac approach to rape.51 Questions remain, 
however, regarding the appropriateness of applying a consent-based definition in the context 
of war crimes and crimes against humanity.52 Prosecutors at the ICTY, for example, have 
suggested that this is ‘an area where perhaps the OTP [Office of the Prosecutor] could have 
paid more attention to forcefully explaining to the chambers the pitfalls of automatically 
incorporating domestic law concepts that are not well-suited to the distinctive framework of 
international criminal law’.53 The OTP at the ICTR has also expressed concerns and posited 
that there are ‘strong reasons’ to reject a consent requirement in conflict and post-conflict 
contexts.54 One of the reasons why the Bemba judgement is significant is precisely because it 
does not employ a consent-based definition of rape. 
 
 
50 Judgement, Kunarac, Kovač and Vuković (IT-96-23& IT-96-23/1-A), Appeal Judgement, 12 June 2002, 
§127-128. See also Judgement, Kvočka et al. (IT-98-30/1-A), Appeal Judgement, 28 February 2005, § 395; 
Judgement, Gacumbitsi (ICTR-2001-64-A), Appeal Judgement, 7 July 2006, § 151. 
 
51 See, for example, Judgement, Semanza (No. ICTR-97-20-T), Trial Judgement and Sentence, 15 May 2003, § 
345; Judgement, Kaing, supra note 42, at § 362-363; Judgement, Gacumbitsi, ibid., at § 155. The Special Court 
for Sierra Leone (SCSL) has adopted a narrower approach, by emphasizing that force or threat of force provide 
clear evidence of non-consent. Judgement, Brima, Kamara and Kanu (SCSL-04-16-T), Trial Judgement, 20 
June 2007, § 493-494; Judgement, Sessay, Kallon and Gbao (SCSL-04-15-T), Trial Judgement, 2 March 2002, 
§ 1461.  
 
52 Cole, for example, maintains that ‘Although it cannot be denied that a woman’s autonomous consent should 
be the prerequisite for anything done to her body, the definition of rape under international criminal law 
ordinarily presupposes a context of armed conflict, the victims of which by definition are under a non-
consensual attack. In other words, the determination of jurisdiction amounts to a determination that the sexual 
act took place in a context in which sexual autonomy was absent’. A. Cole, ‘Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi: The New 
Definition for Prosecuting Rape under International Law’, 8 International Criminal Law Review (2008) 55-86, 
at 75. In a similar vein, Schomburg and Peterson opine that ‘Although other factors may play an additional role, 
they cannot supersede the inherent coerciveness of crimes under international law and cannot serve as an 
argument for considering nonconsent as an element of crimes of sexual violence in this context’. W. Schomburg 
and I. Peterson, ‘Genuine Consent to Sexual Violence under International Criminal Law’, 101 American Journal 
of International Law (2007) 121-140, at 139. 
 
53 M. Jarvis and N. Nabti, ‘Policies and Institutional Strategies for Successful Violence Prosecutions’, in S. 
Brammertz and M. Jarvis (eds), Prosecuting Conflict-Related Sexual Violence at the ICTY (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016) 73-110, at 94-95. The Kunarac Trial Chamber, for example, reviewed other legal 
jurisdictions and concluded that ‘…the basic underlying principle common to them was that sexual penetration 
will constitute rape if it is not truly voluntary or consensual on the part of the victim’. Judgement, Kunarac, 
supra note 46, at § 440. 
 
54 OTP, Prosecution of Sexual Violence: Best-Practices Manual for the Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual 
Violence Crimes in Post-Conflict Regions – Lessons Learned from the Office of the Prosecutor for the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 30 January 2014, available online at 
http://w.unictr.org/sites/unictr.org/files/legal-library/140130_prosecution_of_sexual_violence.pdf (visited 2 July 
2014), 58. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Bemba and the ‘de-centring’ of consent  
 
What is immediately striking about the Bemba judgement is the fact that it contains very few 
references to consent.55 Rape is not defined in the Rome Statute but in the accompanying 
Elements of Crimes. The latter define rape – as a crime against humanity or war crime – as 
occurring when:  
 
1. The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, 
however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual 
organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part 
of the body. 
 
2. The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that 
caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of 
power, against such person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive 
environment, or the invasion was committed against a person incapable of giving 
genuine consent.56 
 
The Bemba Trial Chamber utilized this definition of rape.57 Moreover, it explicitly 
emphasized that ‘…the victim’s lack of consent is not a legal element of the crime of rape 
under the Statute’.58 It noted from the preparatory works of the Statute that the drafters were 
of the view that requiring the Prosecution to prove the victim’s non-consent ‘would, in most 
cases, undermine efforts to bring perpetrators to justice’.59 
 
The Trial Chamber therefore focused on the four possible circumstances for rape that are set 
out in the Elements of Crimes. Only the fourth of these circumstances refers to consent and 
stipulates that ‘the invasion was committed against a person incapable of giving genuine 
consent’. Regarding the meaning of ‘incapable’, the Bemba Trial Chamber noted that 
‘Footnotes 16 and 64 of the Elements of Crimes clarify that “a person may be incapable of 
55 It discussed consent primarily in the context of pillaging. For example, ‘…the Chamber is of the view that in 
certain circumstances lack of consent can be inferred from the absence of the rightful owner from the place from 
where property was taken’. Judgement, Bemba, supra note 7, at § 116. 
 
56 Article 7 (1) (g)-1 and Article 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-1, Elements of Crimes, supra note 14, at § 1, 2. 
57 Judgement, Bemba, supra note 7, at § 99, 102. 
58 Ibid., at § 105. Similarly, in the Katanga judgement, the Trial Chamber noted that ‘…save the very specific 
situation of a person whose “incapacity” was “tak[en] advantage of”, the Elements of Crimes do not refer to the 
victim’s lack of consent, and therefore this need not be proven’. Judgement, Katanga, supra note 4, at § 965. 
59 Ibid. 
                                                          
giving genuine consent if affected by natural, induced or age-related incapacity”’.60 This is a 
very different situation from coercive circumstances overpowering a victim’s free will, as 
discussed in Kunarac. Although it is unclear which factors may ‘induce’ an incapacity to give 
consent, the particular positioning of the word ‘induced’ between ‘natural’ and ‘age-related’ 
arguably limits the range of potential inducing factors. Fundamentally, therefore, the 
Elements of Crimes appear to draw a clear distinction between circumstances and consent, 
and the Bemba judgement reinforces this. It underscores that ‘where “force”, “threat of force 
or coercion”, or “taking advantage of a coercive environment” is proven, the Chamber 
considers that the Prosecution does not need to prove the victim’s lack of consent’.61 The Pre-
Trial Chamber, moreover, referred to ‘…the constitutive elements of force or coercion in the 
crime of rape…’.62  
 
Hence, a significant way in which the Bemba judgement differs from existing international 
jurisprudence on rape is that it treats circumstances – as set out in the Elements of Crimes – 
as important in their own right, rather than in the more limited sense of whether they vitiate 
consent. In this regard, the judgement particularly adds to extant case law through its 
discussion of the term ‘coercive environment’. It is clear from the wording of the Elements of 
Crimes that a ‘coercive environment’ is broader than force, threat of force or coercion. The 
Bemba judgement, however, usefully concretizes this concept, taking guidance from the 
Akayesu judgement at the ICTR. In that case, the Trial Chamber offered a definition of rape63 
that necessitated a discussion of the words ‘coercive circumstances’ and underlined that: 
 
[C]oercive circumstances need not be evidenced by a show of physical force. Threats, 
intimidation, extortion and other forms of duress which prey on fear or desperation may 
constitute coercion, and coercion may be inherent in certain circumstances, such as 
armed conflict or the military presence of Interahamwe [militia] among refugee Tutsi 
women at the bureau communal.64  
60 Ibid., at § 107. 
61 Ibid., at § 106. See also Judgement, Katanga, supra note 4, at § 965. 
62 Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08), Pre-Trial Chamber, 15 June 2009, § 310. 
 
63 ‘…a physical invasion of a sexual nature committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive’. 
Judgement, Akayesu, supra note 14, at § 686. 
64 Ibid., at § 688. 
                                                          
This is an important definition that recognizes the multi-layered reality of coercion in 
situations of armed conflict, and the fact that it can assume both active (actions) and passive 
(circumstances) forms. Similarly, the Bemba Trial Chamber broadly construed the meaning 
of ‘coercive environment’. It found, for example, that in addition to the presence of a hostile 
military force among a civilian population, several other factors could contribute to creating a 
coercive environment. These included ‘the number of people involved in the commission of 
the crime, or whether the rape is committed during or immediately following a combat 
situation, or is committed together with other crimes’.65 This notion of situational coercion is 
inherently suited to the realities and complexities of conflict situations.  
 
The Kunarac definition of rape itself places a strong emphasis on ‘coercive circumstances’, 
broadly construed. However, the Trial Chamber arguably limited the significance of these 
circumstances by ‘pinning’ them to the question of consent. Kunarac, in short, epitomizes a 
‘functional’ approach to circumstances; the central issue is whether the presence of coercive 
circumstances impacted on the victim’s ability to freely give consent. In contrast, the concept 
of a ‘coercive environment’, detached from the issue of consent, potentially creates the space 
for a greater focus on what the victim experienced within the context of that environment.  
 
Particularly salient in this regard is the fact that the Elements of Crimes require the ‘taking 
advantage of a coercive environment’, rather than simply the existence of a coercive 
environment. The Bemba judgement refers only briefly to this notion of taking advantage.66 
This is presumably because there was sufficient evidence in the Bemba case of force, or 
threat of force or coercion (the first and second circumstances set out in the Elements of 
Crimes).67 As such, it was unnecessary for the Trial Chamber to consider whether MLC 
troops had taken advantage of a coercive environment. The terminology of ‘taking 
advantage’, however, is highly significant. Fundamentally, it reflects the abuse of power 
65 Judgement, Bemba, supra note 7, at § 104. 
66 Ibid. 
67 This was more explicit in the Pre-Trial Chamber’s discussions. For example, it stated, inter alia, that ‘The 
evidence shows that direct witnesses were raped by several MLC perpetrators in turn, that their clothes were 
ripped off by force, that they were pushed to the ground, immobilised by MLC soldiers standing on or holding 
them, raped at gunpoint, in public or in front of or near their family members. The element of force, threat of 
force or coercion was thus a prevailing factor’. Decision, Bemba, supra note 62, at § 165. 
                                                          
which rape embodies,68 and it more effectively captures the totality of the crime than an 
approach that places consent at the centre of the enquiry. According to Grewal,  ‘While 
consent in the context of rape laws has sometimes been a problematic concept, it has also 
been seen as a key means of recognizing the right of an individual to exercise freedom of 
choice and control over one’s body and life’.69 Yet, precisely because the term ‘taking 
advantage of a coercive environment’ refers not just to a behaviour, but more specifically to a 
behaviour that takes place within a particular context, it can be argued that it more effectively 
encapsulates the diversity of factual matrixes that inhibit an individual’s sexual autonomy and 
freedom of choice. 
 
Rule 70 of the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) helps to illustrate this point. 
Halley submits that there are contradictions between the Court’s RPE and Elements of 
Crimes. In particular, she asserts that Rule 70 of the RPE provides a consent-based defence, 
while in the Elements of Crimes, in contrast, ‘we have a definition of rape that seems actually 
to preclude a consent defense’.70 Rule 70 states, in relevant part, that: 
 
In cases of sexual violence, the Court shall be guided by and, where appropriate, apply 
the following principles: 
 
(a) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a victim where 
force, threat of force, coercion or taking advantage of a coercive environment 
undermined the victim’s ability to give voluntary and genuine consent;   
(b) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a victim where the 
victim is incapable of giving genuine consent;  
(c) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of the silence of, or lack of resistance by, a 
victim to the alleged sexual violence.71 
68 See, for example, S. Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (New York: Fawcett Columbine, 
1975), 49. Noting that ‘…various states criminalize sexual acts between individuals in unequal positions of 
power, irrespective of the consent of the victim’, Schomburg and Peterson maintain that ‘If international 
criminal law relied at all on domestic law to define sexual violence, it should draw from such examples instead 
of general provisions that focus on consent’. Schomburg and Peterson, supra note 52, at § 138-139. Indeed, the 
second circumstance listed in the Elements of Crimes specifically refers to ‘abuse of power’. 
69 K. Grewal, ‘The Protection of Sexual Autonomy under International Law: The International Criminal Court 
and the Challenge of Defining Rape’, 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2012) 373-396, at 383. 
70 J. Halley, ‘Rape at Rome: Feminist Interventions in the Criminalization of Sex-Related Violence in Positive 
International Criminal Law’, 30 Michigan Journal of International Law (2008) 1-123, at 119 
71 ICC, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, available online at https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/legal-
texts/RulesProcedureEvidenceEng.pdf (visited 24 April 2016). Rule 70 echoes Rule 90 of the SCSL’s Rules of 
                                                          
The Bemba judgement does not discuss Rule 70. It simply notes that, ‘…the Chamber, when 
analysing evidence, is guided by Rules 70 and 71,72 which set out several principles of 
evidence in cases of sexual violence’.73 The Katanga judgement, however, offers more in 
relation to Rule 70. It emphasizes that: 
The Elements of Crimes clearly seek to punish any act of penetration where committed 
under threat of force or of coercion, such as that caused by the threat of violence, 
duress, detention, psychological pressure or abuse of power or, more generally, any act 
of penetration taking advantage of a coercive environment. The establishment of at 
least one of the coercive circumstances or conditions set out in the second element is 
therefore sufficient alone for penetration to amount to rape within the meaning of 
articles 7(1)(g) and 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Statute.74 
 
 
In the following paragraph, it further states that, ‘…in terms of procedure, the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence confirm this interpretation by stipulating the principles applicable to 
evidence in matters of sexual violence’.75 Taken together, these two paragraphs appear to 
suggest, pace Halley, that there is no contradiction between the Elements of Crimes and Rule 
70.  By placing important limits on when consent can be inferred, Rule 70 thus reinforces the 
importance of circumstances as established in the Elements of Crimes. Furthermore, because 
it explicitly introduces into the relationship between consent and circumstances the additional 
dimension of how a victim behaves, speaks and reacts in those circumstances, Rule 70 
reflects a contextually-sensitive approach to rape that is more focused on the entirety of the 
victim’s experiences. In Katanga, for example, some of the witnesses who had been raped 
described how the perpetrators referred to them as their ‘wives’.76 In a country like the DRC 
where marital rape is not recognized,77 this ‘wife’ label both constrained women’s choices 
and contributed to their suffering. As witness P-132 underlined, ‘You know full well that 
Evidence, as discussed in the Armed Force Revolutionary Council (AFRC) judgement. Judgement, Brima, 
Kamara and Kanu, supra note 51, at § 114. 
 
72 Rule 71 states that ‘…a Chamber shall not admit evidence of the prior or subsequent sexual conduct of a 
victim or witness’. 
73 Judgement, Bemba, supra note 7 at § 109. 
74 Judgement, Katanga, supra note 4, at § 965. 
75 Ibid., at § 966. 
76 See, for example, ibid., at § 997. 
77 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, ‘Democratic Republic of Congo: Domestic and Sexual Violence, 
including Legislation, State Protection and Services Available to Victims’, 17 April 2012, available online at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4f9e5e532.html (visited 24 April 2016). 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
when someone takes you for his wife, he can have sexual intercourse whenever and however 
he wishes. He told me that I had become his wife. I could not refuse’.78 
 
If, as this article maintains, the Elements of Crimes and RPE potentially thus allow for a more 
experiential approach to rape, a second important dimension of the Bemba judgement is 
precisely that it discusses some of the consequences of the rapes that MLC forces committed 
in the CAR.  
 
4. The Consequences of Rape 
 
In the Čelebići trial at the ICTY, the Trial Chamber reflected on some of the consequences of 
rape. Describing it as ‘a despicable act which strikes at the very core of human dignity and 
physical integrity’, it underscored that rape causes severe physical and psychological pain 
and suffering, adding that the psychological effects of the crime ‘can be particularly acute 
and long lasting’.79  
 
In the Nikolić case, also at the ICTY, a section of the Trial Chamber sentencing judgement 
discusses some of the long-term consequences for the men and women who were imprisoned 
in the Sušica camp in Vlasenica, in eastern Bosnia. It cites a witness who was raped in the 
camp. She explains, ‘I feel miserable, degraded. I wanted to be a good mother, the best I 
could. I wanted my child to grow up in a beautiful family, but that couldn’t be any more. I 
felt humiliated as a woman and as a mother by the very fact that I was there in that camp in 
that situation’.80  
 
In the Akayesu case, the first trial at the ICTR to address the use of rape during the 1994 
Rwandan genocide, the Trial Chamber acknowledged some of the ways in which Witness 
JJ’s trauma had impacted on her life. It noted that she ‘testified to the humiliation she felt as a 
mother, by the public nudity and being raped in the presence of children by young 
78 Judgement, Katanga, supra note 4, at § 1000. 
79 Judgement, Mucić et al., supra note 36, at § 495. 
80 Judgement, Nikolić (IT-94-2-S), Trial Sentencing Judgement, 18 November 2003, § 203. 
                                                          
men…Witness JJ told the Chamber that she had remarried but that her life had never been the 
same because of the beatings and rapes she suffered’.81 
 
Within the Bemba judgement, the multiple consequences of the MLC’s rapes are discussed in 
considerable detail. Some of the MLC’s victims in the CAR sustained physical injuries. After 
being raped by three soldiers in early November 2002, for example, ‘…P80 had physical 
injuries to her vagina, back, pelvis, kidneys, and eyes…’;82 and P81, who was sexually 
violated by four soldiers, also in November 2002, had abdominal pains and problems 
conceiving.83 As in Rwanda during the genocide, some women became infected with the HIV 
virus.84 However, it was not only women who were sexually abused by members of Bemba’s 
MLC. P23 was raped by three soldiers, in front of his family members and a neighbour. 
Afterwards, he ‘…could not walk, as his anus was swollen and he was treated only with 
traditional leaves’.85 P69 was also raped, by two soldiers, which led to ‘severe damage to his 
anus…’.86 For others, the consequences of being raped were primarily psychological. P22, 
for example, ‘was suicidal, reluctant to engage in any sexual relationship and exhibited 
symptoms consistent with post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”)’.87  
 
Understanding the effects of rape, however, requires a holistic approach that extends beyond 
a focus on physical and psychological harms. It is noteworthy, therefore, that the Bemba Trial 
Chamber also discussed some of the wider social and economic consequences of rape. For 
example, twelve soldiers raped V1 orally, vaginally and anally. As well as subsequently 
experiencing pain in her vagina and lungs, and having psychological problems, ‘She felt like 
she was no longer treated as a human being and was called the “Banyamulengué wife”’.88 She 
became a social outcast within her own community, and this in turn ‘left her unemployed and 
81 Judgement, Akayesu, supra note 14, at § 423.  
 
82 Judgement, Bemba, supra note 7, at § 488. 
83 Ibid., at § 492. 
84 Ibid., at § 545. 
85 Ibid., at § 494. 
86 Ibid., at § 498. 
87 Ibid., at § 508. 
88 Ibid., at § 551. The Trial Chamber noted that ‘Many CAR civilians used the term “Banyamulengué” (or 
phonetically similar terms) to refer to the MLC troops. Civilians could identify the MLC troops due to their 
presence in certain areas and other characteristics, including language, weapons, and uniforms’ (§ 563). 
 
                                                          
unable to provide for her children’.89 P82 was between 10 and 13 years old (her precise age 
was unclear) when she was raped. In addition to her physical injuries, she was ‘socially 
excluded by other girls of her age’.90 After P23 was raped, he no longer felt respected within 
his community and saw himself as a ‘dead man’;91 and before P69 was orally and anally 
penetrated, at least four soldiers had also ‘slept with’92 his wife, who subsequently needed to 
have an operation. As a result of these events, P69’s family, in his words, was ‘completely 
destroyed’.93 
 
Some commentators may question whether it is appropriate for an international court to 
discuss at such length the various ways in which rape can affect victims’ lives. The 
consequences of rape are tangential to the central issue of whether a defendant is guilty of 
rape. It might be argued, therefore, that introducing more affective elements into the trial 
process potentially interferes with the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Conversely, the claim 
could also be made that it is not beneficial to witnesses themselves to focus heavily on the 
consequences of what they experienced as it risks essentializing them as victims. Discussing 
the Kunarac trial, for example, a former ICTY prosecutor, Peggy Kuo, has explained that she 
viewed the witnesses as survivors rather than victims. In her words,  
 
Sometimes people will talk about how the women were humiliated. But I always try to 
turn that around and say, “The perpetrators tried to humiliate them and they tried to 
take away their human dignity. But the people who came and testified were able to 
maintain their dignity. And they didn’t let the perpetrators take their humanity away 
from them”.94  
 
89 Ibid., at § 551. 
90 Ibid., at § 589. 
91 Ibid., at § 494. 
92 Some witnesses used the words ‘slept with’ rather than ‘raped’ or ‘penetrated’. Similarly, Rwandan women 
who testified at the ICTR frequently employed words other than ‘rape’ to describe what had happened to them, 
due to social taboos.  According to the Tribunal’s OTP, ‘…some Rwandan rape victims would refer to rape or 
penetration by stating that the perpetrator “married me”, “put his sex in me”, “made me a woman”, “spoiled 
me”, “killed me with his thing”, or “made me his wife”’. OTP, supra note 54, at 14. The issue of terminology 
was also discussed in the Akayesu Trial Chamber Judgement. Judgement, Akayesu, supra note 14, at § 152. 
93 Ibid., at § 498. 
 
94 Cited in P. Gopanal, D. Kravetz and A. Menon, ‘Proving Crimes of Sexual Violence’, in S. Brammertz and 
M. Jarvis (eds), Prosecuting Conflict-Related Sexual Violence at the ICTY (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2016) 111-171, at 112.  
 
                                                          
The fact that the Bemba Trial Chamber discussed some of the many effects of the rapes 
committed by MLC soldiers is, however, extremely important. The first reason is that one of 
the common criticisms of criminal trials is that victim-witnesses are simply in court to give 
evidence. Their role is to help the judges to establish whether or not a particular defendant is 
guilty. In the words of an ICTR prosecutor, ‘The trial process has its own needs’95 – and 
these needs take priority. Courts are interested in ascertaining the facts, and this, in turn, leads 
to a marginalization of victims’ needs.96 If, as Coulter maintains, ‘In most “war narratives” it 
is the individual women’s bodies and the violence done to them that occupy center stage’,97 
the same argument is equally pertinent vis-à-vis international criminal courts. If victim-
witnesses speak about their emotions, and about how their lives have been affected as a result 
of rape, this becomes problematic because it necessarily raises the issue of needs; and rape 
gives rise to a multiplicity of complex needs, both short-term and long-term, that courts are 
not designed to address. The criminal trial process accordingly limits the stories that victims 
are able to tell.  As Dixon underscores,  
…there is no opportunity for women to speak about crimes of secondary victimization 
committed by their own intimates and communities. There is no discursive space to 
document the likelihood that the victims of rape will face other secondary harms such 
as rejection, repression, destitution and continuing prostitution.98  
 
In the Bemba trial, victim-witnesses – men and women – were given the opportunity to tell 
the court how the MLC’s crimes had affected them and their daily lives.99 Not only does this 
95 Cited in J. Koomen, ‘“Without These Women, the Tribunal Cannot do Anything”: The Politics of Witness 
Testimony on Sexual Violence at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’, 38 Signs: Journal of Women 
in Culture and Society (2013) 253-277, at 264. 
 
96 K. McEvoy and K. McConnachie, ‘Victims and Transitional Justice: Voice, Agency and Blame’, 22 Social 
and Legal Studies (2013) 489-513, at 494. 
 
97 C. Coulter, Bush Wives and Girl Soldiers: Women’s Lives through War and Peace in Sierra Leone (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2007), 18-19. 
 
98 R. Dixon, ‘Rape as a Crime in International Humanitarian Law: Where to from Here?’ 13 European Journal 
of International Law (2002) 697-719, at 705. 
 
99 Additional insights were provided by the legal representatives of victims. One of these representatives, for 
example, told the Court that: ‘There was also a victim who presented her concerns in public and this is Victim 
a/0542/08. She explained that she had her period when the Banyamulenge raped her and one of them shoved the 
barrel of his gun into her vagina to punish her for allegedly having her period deliberately at that time. 
Following her rape, she was abandoned by her husband. That is double suffering’. Trial transcript, Bemba (ICC-
01/05-01/08), 13 November 2014, 3, available online at https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc2194807.pdf 
(visited 25 April 2016). 
 
                                                          
individualize victims, but it also creates the space for greater acknowledgement and 
understanding of their needs – and particularly their long-term needs. What makes this 
especially important in the Bemba case is that unlike the ICTY and ICTR, the ICC has a 
capacity – through, for example, its power to award reparations100 and its Trust Fund101 – to 
respond in a concrete way to some of the multiple needs of victims in post-conflict societies. 
Sajad is correct in arguing that, ‘Ultimately, seeking justice in courts of law does not 
overcome many of the socio-political circumstances that define the realities of survivors of 
wartime and genocidal sexual violence’.102 In the Bemba case, however, victim-witnesses 
were given the opportunity to bring those realities into the courtroom, and this is one way in 
which to develop a more ‘holistic’ justice103 that fuses retributive and restorative elements 
and takes account of victims’ needs.104 It should be noted in this regard that the Trial 
Chamber considered not only the consequences of rape, but also the impact of the MLC’s 
widespread looting.105 The judgement thus reflects ‘the range of conflict-related harms 
experienced by the victims…’,106 and it thereby avoids ‘singling out’ and essentializing those 
who were raped.  
 
The Bemba judgement’s discussion of some of the effects and consequences of rape is also 
important for a second reason. That many of the victims of Bemba’s MLC subsequently 
experienced further suffering at the hands of their own communities underscores the global 
problem of persistent rape stigma. According to a woman who was raped in the DRC, for 
example, 
100 Article 75 of the Rome Statute. 
101 Article 79 of the Rome Statute. 
102 T. Sajjad, ‘Rape on Trial: Promises of International Jurisprudence, Perils of Retributive Justice, and the 
Realities of Impunity’, in C. Rittner and J.K. Roth (eds), Rape: Weapon of War and Genocide, (St. Paul, MN: 
Paragon House, 2012) 61-81, at 75. 
103 A. Boraine, ‘Transitional Justice: A Holistic Interpretation’, 60 Journal of International Affairs (2006) 17-27. 
104 S. Robins, ‘Towards Victim-Centred Transitional Justice: Understanding the Needs of Families of the 
Disappeared in Postconflict Nepal’, 5 International Journal of Transitional Justice (2011) 75-98. 
105 It noted that ‘Victims of pillaging were often left with nothing. The consequences were far-reaching. For 
example, P73 was unable to pay for medical treatment, V2’s business has never recovered from the loss of 
necessary equipment, and many victims were left without, inter alia, their savings, foam mattresses, and clothes, 
which they had worked hard to obtain’. Judgement, Bemba, supra note 7, at § 568. 
106 Jarvis and Nabti, supra note 53, at 87. 
                                                          
When [other women] see you walking, if it is two of them, they start gossiping and they 
say: “Do you know that this woman has been raped?”…When we see that, we are 
heart-broken because everyone is talking about what happened to us – then they start 




In neighbouring Rwanda, Mukamana and Brysiewicz point out that those who were raped 
during the genocide have been treated differently from other groups of victims. As one 
illustration, ‘After the genocide organized rituals of mourning were held for people who had 
lost their loved ones and these people were able to benefit from the sympathy and support of 
their community’. In contrast, there were no such ceremonies for victims of rape.108  
 
These examples underscore the need for greater education and sensitization efforts, which are 
crucial tools in the fight against rape stigma. It is essential for local communities to have 
more awareness and understanding of rape and of what it can do to victims and their lives. 
The fact, therefore, that the Bemba Trial Chamber explicitly discussed some of the effects of 
the MLC’s rapes highlights the potential for courts themselves to be involved – indirectly – in 
combatting the stigma and prejudices that continue to cling to crimes of rape and sexual 
violence.  
 
5. Motives for Rape 
 
 
In the Furundžija trial at the ICTY, which focused on the interrogation and sexual abuse of 
Witness A, the Trial Chamber found that:  
Witness A was interrogated by the accused [Furundžija].109 She was forced by Accused 
B to undress and remain naked before a substantial number of soldiers…The purpose of 
this abuse was to extract information from Witness A about her family, her connection 
107 J. Kelly, J. Kabanga , W. Cragin , L. Alcayna-Stevens, S. Haider and M.J. Vanrooyen, ‘“If Your Husband 
Doesn't Humiliate You, Other People Won’t’: Gendered Attitudes Towards Sexual Violence in Eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo’, 7 Global Public Health: An International Journal for Research, Policy and 
Practice (2012) 285-298, at 290. 
 
108 D. Mukamana and P. Brysiewicz, ‘The Lived Experience of Genocide Rape Survivors in Rwanda’, 40 
Journal of Nursing Scholarship (2008) 379-384, at 380. 
109 Anto Furundžija was a Bosnian Croat soldier and the head of the ‘Jokers’, a unit of the Croatian Defence 
Council (HVO) in Central BiH. 
                                                          
with the ABiH [Army of Bosnia-Hercegovina] and her relationship with certain 
Croatian soldiers, and also to degrade and humiliate her. 110  
 
Similarly, in the Čelebići trial, the Trial Chamber explicitly commented on some of the 
purposes underpinning the rape of two Bosnian Serb women by Hazim Delić, the Bosniak 
deputy commander of the Čelebići camp. Delić raped Grozdana Ćećez, the Trial Chamber 
found,  
…inter alia, to obtain information about the whereabouts of Ms. Ćećez’s husband who 
was considered an armed rebel; to punish her for her inability to provide information 
about her husband; to coerce and intimidate her into providing such information; and to 
punish her for the acts of her husband.111 
 
In keeping with these examples, the Bemba Trial Chamber discussed some of the purposes of 
the rapes committed by MLC soldiers in the CAR. These included a desire both to punish 
civilians in the CAR (and specifically those suspected of supporting General Bozizé)112 and 
to ‘destabilise, humiliate, and punish suspected rebels and rebel sympathisers’.113 The Trial 
Chamber also noted that some MLC soldiers regarded their victims as ‘war booty’.114 It went 
on to underline that the MLC’s objectives were often realized in the sense that ‘rape victims 
experienced significant medical, psychiatric, psychological, and social consequences, 
including PTSD, HIV, social rejection, stigmatisation, and feelings of humiliation, anxiety, 
and guilt’.115  
 
Significantly, the Bemba judgement not only discusses some of the purposes underlying the 
MLC’s use of rape. It also – and unusually – addresses the issue of motives. Taylor has 
argued that ‘If our morality were truly victim-centred…we would spend less time worrying 
about the perpetrator motives and more time focused on repairing and preventing harm…’.116 
110 Judgement, Furundžija, supra note 42, at § 124. 
111 Judgement, Mucić et al., supra note 36, at § 941. 
112 Judgement, Bemba, supra note 7, at § 565. 
113 Ibid., at § 567. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid. 
116 K. Taylor, Cruelty: Human Evil and the Human Brain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 258. 
                                                          
Criminal courts are neither victim-centred processes nor are they places for reflection on – 
much less ‘worrying about’ – a perpetrator’s possible motives for committing a crime. As the 
ICTY Appeals Chamber underlined in the Tadić case, ‘…motive is generally irrelevant in 
criminal law…’.117 This includes rape cases. Various ICTY chambers, for example, ‘have 
repeatedly rejected alleged sexual motivations as a defence to sexual violence as torture, 
finding that sexual motives could not displace the purpose behind the act’.118  
 
The Bemba Trial Chamber, however, focused not on sexual motives, but rather on socio-
economic motives. It emphasized, for example, that ‘The MLC troops in the CAR did not 
receive adequate financial compensation and, in turn, self-compensated through acts of 
pillaging and rape’.119 In so doing, they relied upon the so-called ‘Article 15’, which 
unofficially gave MLC forces the green light to do whatever was necessary to ‘make ends 
meet’.120 Some MLC soldiers, moreover, told their victims that they were hungry.121 Scholars 
have frequently sought to explain the occurrence of rape in war through a focus on macro 
structural factors, such as militarism, patriarchy and gender relations.122 Such explanations 
are often overly-broad and they neglect the micro dynamics of causation.123 The Bemba Trial 
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(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) 171-219, at 191. See, for example, Judgement, Kunarac, supra note 
50, at §153; Judgement, Kvočka et al., supra note 50, at § 369-370.  
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Chamber’s discussion of socio-economic factors is important precisely because it situates the 
complexities of causation within the specific operational context of the MLC. 
 
The fact that the Trial Chamber considered the issue of motives, however, needs to be 
understood within the particular framework of the mode of liability charged (command 
responsibility). If Bemba’s soldiers were raping and looting because they were not being 
adequately paid and were hungry, this constituted important evidence that he had ‘failed to 
take all necessary and reasonable measures within his…power to prevent or repress’ the 
MLC’s crimes.124 Indeed, the Trial Chamber explicitly stated that ‘…if the soldiers had 
received adequate payment and rations, the risk that they would pillage or rape for self-
compensation, and murder those who resisted, would have been reduced, if not 
eliminated’.125  
 
The Trial Chamber also implicitly acknowledged that preventing/minimizing the occurrence 
of rape necessarily requires a multi-dimensional approach. It did so by setting out very 
clearly a long list of the various measures that Bemba should have undertaken as a 
commander. These included ensuring that his troops in the CAR were fully trained in the 
rules of international humanitarian law, initiating genuine investigations into any crimes 
committed by his soldiers and altering troop deployments to reduce their contact with civilian 
populations.126 In other words, contrary to Taylor’s aforementioned assertion that we should 
be concerned with victims, not with perpetrators and their motives, the key point is that we 
are not required to choose one or the other. The Bemba Trial Chamber’s discussion of 
command responsibility led it to highlight some of the practical steps that commanders could 




This article set out to explore what the Bemba judgement adds to existing international 
jurisprudence on rape. It has examined three particular elements of the judgement, namely its 
definition of rape, its consideration of the effects of rape and its discussion of perpetrators’ 
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motives. All of these elements make the judgement distinctive in various ways. 
Fundamentally, however, the key jurisprudential contribution of the judgement is that it 
demonstrates how the Elements of Crimes potentially offer a more victim-centred approach 
to rape. Although it can be argued that the idea of consent still implicitly underlies the first 
three circumstances set out in the Elements of Crimes, the key point is that these 
circumstances are independent of the issue of consent. When circumstances are thus 
‘detached’ from consent, the parameters of enquiry accordingly change.  Rather than asking 
whether those circumstances affected a victim’s ability to give free consent, we can focus 
more on how they affected the individual and what he or she experienced. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
